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Chapter 10 
Conceptualising Privacy in Relation to 
Medical Research Values 
Deryck Beyleveld 
Introduction 
Many medical researchers are hostile towards laws that protect privacy, For example, 
in November 2000 the Health Service Journal reported on a campaign by cancer 
epidemiologists led by Professor Peto (henceforth, `the Peto campaign'), that called 
for all medical research to be exempted from the UK Data Protection Act 1998 and for 
the common law on confidentiality to be relaxed. ' In particular, the epidemiologists 
claimed that the need to obtain consent was impracticable and led to poor research 
results, which meant that more people were dying than need be the case. 
This campaign suggests a particular conception of the relationship between 
protection of privacy (and other fundamental rights and freedoms implicated 
in data protection/the protection of confidentiality) and the values that guide (or 
should guide) medical research, which I will designate `the conflict model' of the 
relationship between privacy and medical research values, coupled with a `narrow' 
conception of the right to privacy, according to which the only legitimate privacy 
interest that persons have in the use made of sensitive personal data relating to them 
is in protection of their personal identities. Such a `narrow' conception of privacy, 
which implies that the right to privacy is not engaged in the use of personal data once 
it has been rendered anonymous, has received some support from the Court of Appeal 
of England and Wales., However, I shall argue that the jurisprudence surrounding 
Article 8.1 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) consistently 
propounds a broad conception of this right, according to which it protects a very 
wide range of interests. Indeed, under this `broad' conception, any use made of 
sensitive personal data engages Article 8.1 of the ECHR unless explicit consent has 
been given by the person to whom it relates. Without this consent, anv use made of 
sensitive personal data will be a breach of Article 8 ECHR, unless a justification for 
I `Cancer Experts Call for Action on GMC's Confidentiality Rules', 2 November 2000 
Health Service Journal, 4. 
2Rv Department of'Health, Ex Parte Source Informatics Ltd. [ 1999] 4 AlI ER 185 in 
the High Court, [2000] 1 All ER 786 in the Court of Appeal of England and \ Vales. See note 
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this is available under Article 8.2 ECHR. Given the place of the ECHR in relation to 
UK domestic law, to EC law, and the relationship between EC law and UK domestic 
law, legally, the broad conception must be adopted. 
I will also argue that the broad conception of privacy implies a complex set of 
relationships between privacy and medical research values, in which these values, 
while certainly capable of coming into conflict, can also systematically support each 
other, which suggests a different model, which I will call the `co-operative model'. 
I will argue that this conception is also implied by standard public interest reasons 
(ignored by the Court of Appeal in Source Informatics3) for considering data relating 
to a person's health given to health professionals to be confidential. In addition, there 
are good ethical reasons for preferring the co-operative model. 
Finally, I will make some suggestions as to how conflicts between privacy and 
medical research values (which can still arise within the co-operative model) are to 
be assessed. 
Narrow Conception: The Source Informatics Case 
In R v. Department cif 'Health Ex Parte Source Informatics Ltd., ' Source Informatics 
Ltd., a database company seeking to obtain information about GPs prescribing 
habits from pharmacists, which it hoped to sell to pharmaceutical companies for the 
purposes of direct marketing of GPs, applied for declaratory relief against advice 
given to pharmacists and GPs by the Department of Health in a letter to Health 
Authorities. The letter advised that GPs and pharmacists who participated in such 
schemes without the consent of patients would be acting in breach of confidence 
even if the information was disclosed to database companies like Source Informatics 
Ltd. in anonymous form, because patients give the information for their treatment 
not for the purposes of these schemes. In the High Court, Latham J declared the 
Department of Health's advice to be lawful. However, this judgment was overturned 
on appeal (in which the General Medical Council, the Medical Research Council, the 
Association of British Pharmaceutical Industries and the National Pharmaceutical 
Association all intervened on the side of Source Informatics Ltd. ). The Court of 
Appeal's reasoning (Simon Brown LJ giving the leading judgment, which was 
supported without comment by Aldous LJ and Schiemann LJ) was essentially that 
the basis of the duty of confidence in the use of information given by patients to 
health professionals for their treatment lies in equity, with the consequence that 
the scope of the duty rests on nothing more and nothing less than whether there 
can be further use or disclosure of the data without unfair treatment of the patient. 
3 Supra cit. 
4Rv. f)epartinent of Health, Ex Parte Source Informatics Ltd. supra cit. For full 
;: ommentaries see Bevleveld, D. and }-fisted, E.. 'Anonvmisation is not Exoneration'. 4 (1999) 
. 
tIedical Law International. 69-80 and Bevleveld. D. and Histed. E.. 'Betrayal of Confidence 
in the Court of. Anneal'. 4) 2000) . 
tleclical Lau International. 277--l 1I. 
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According the Court, unfair treatment is treatment contrary to the legitimate interests 
of the patient, and in: 
a case like the present which involves personal confidences ... 
[t]he concern of the law 
... 
is to protect the confider's personal privacy. That and that alone is the right at issue in 
this case. ' 
In relation to this, the Court held that concealment of the confider's personal identity 
in any further disclosures or uses of the confided information is sufficient to secure 
protection of the confider's personal privacy. " Thus, since pharmacists were only 
handing over anonymised (indeed, aggregated) data, `[t]he patient's privacy will 
have been safeguarded, not invaded. The pharmacists' duty of confidence will not 
have been breached' 
.7 
While the Court did not go quite so far as to declare that once personal information 
is rendered anonymous it can, under no circumstances whatsoever, continue to attract 
a duty of confidence, the Court nonetheless adopted a very narrow conception of 
privacy. In particular, the Court rejected the idea that the use of the information 
without the consent of the patient necessarily involves a breach of confidence, 
because a breach of confidence is not, in essence, use of information contrary to 
the purposes for which it was confided; the test is rather whether or not further use 
satisfies the confidant's 'own conscience, no more and no less'. ' On this, it matters 
only what a reasonable confidant may do. Thus. the Court is required to ask: 
[OIn the facts of this case: would a reasonable pharmacist's conscience be troubled bN the 
proposed use to be made of the patients' prescriptions? Would he think that by entering 
Source's scheme he was breaking his customers' confidence, making unconscientious use 
of the information they provide`'"' 
gave And the Court gave clear indication that not only would it not consider unconsented 
use to be unfair (and by the same token, a breach of privacy, confident ialittiv'). but that 
it would even he prepared to countenance use against the patient's explicit objection, 
for in the Court's view, there is a need to find a solution to: 
Isluch problems as the well-recognised reluctance of certain people to accept the yiC«s 
of those in authority as to just what is or is not good 
for them, and. let us postulate. the 
occasional patient who expressly purports to refuse permission for his prescription form 
to be used for any purpose sa\ e only the dispensing of the prescribed drugr. 
ý [-, 00()) 1 All f--'R 786. at p. 797. 
6 141. 
7 hi. 
8 Ibid., at p. 792. 
9 Ibid., at p. 796. 
1 tl Id. 
1I Ibid.. at n. 800. 
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While the case concerned confidentiality, not data protection, it should be noted that 
the Court was drawn to declare that processing of the information by the GPs and 
pharmacists would not fall under the Data Protection Directive'2 because Recital 26 
thereof states that the principles of data protection shall not apply to data rendered 
anonymous in such a way that the data subject is no longer identifiable directly or 
indirectly by anyone. When it was argued on behalf of the Department of Health 
that the Directive, by specifying anything done `upon' personal data as processing 
of it, including deletion and destruction of it, renders anonymisation of it a process 
performed upon personal data, '-' to which (according the Recital 26) the principles 
of protection must apply, the Court held that this only has a bearing on cases where 
erasure `could impair the patient's own health requirements'. ' Bearing in mind 
that Article 1.1 of the Directive has it that the object of the Directive is to protect 
fundamental rights and freedoms, in particular, privacy, in the processing of personal 
data, this is questionable unless a very narrow conception of privacy is employed. 
Broad Conception: Jurisprudence of the ECHR 
A different conception of privacy is to be found in the jurisprudence of the European 
Court of Human Rights and the (now defunct) Commission on Human Rights of the 
Council of Europe. 
According to Professor Jacques Velu, the right to respect for private life under 
Article 8.1 of the European Convention on Human Rights protects the individual 
against: 
1. attacks on his physical or mental integrity or his moral or intellectual 
freedom; 
2. attacks on his honour and reputation and similar torts; 
3. the use of his name. identity or likeness; 
4. being spied upon, watched or harassed; 
5. the disclosure of information protected by the duty of professional secrecy. '-` 
Similar statements are routinely made by the European Court of Human Rights in 
its judgments. 'h 
So broad is the conception of this jurisprudence that, as L. G. Loucaides has 
rightly concluded, case law under the European Convention on Human Rights: 
12 Directive 9546,1C. 
13 See Article 2(c). 
14 [2000] 1 All ER 786, at p. 799. 
15 The European Convention on Human Rights and the Right to Respect for Private 
Life, the Home and Communications', in Robertson, A. H. (ed), Privacy and Human Rights, 
Manchester, Manchester University Press, 197;, 12-128, at p. 92. 
16 See, e. g., P. G. and J. H. y. the United Kingdom (4478798 [2001 ] ECHR 546 (25 
Sentember 2001 ). oara 56 and the further references given there. 
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has expounded and upheld the protection of privacy to such a degree that, for all practical 
purposes, the right of privacy has become a functional equivalent of a right of personality. 
potentially embracing all those constituent parts of the personality of the individual that 
are not expressly safeguarded by the European Convention. " 
Furthermore, that this jurisprudence is contrary to the `narrow' conception has been 
explicitly recognised by the Commission of the Council of Europe, according to 
which, while: 
[for numerous Anglo-Saxon and French authors the right to respect for `private life' is 
... the right to 
live as far as one wishes, protected from publicity ... the right to respect 
for private life does not end there [but includes also the right to] ... the 
development and 
fulfilment of one's own personality. ' 
From this it should come as no surprise that, according to the European Court of 
Human Rights, failure to obtain explicit consent for the use of sensitive personal 
information automatically engages Article 8.1 of the ECHR (hence the right to 
private life, and privacy), meaning that any unconsented use of such information is a 
violation of the right to privacy, unless justified within the terms of Article 8.2. " 
The Narrow Conception and the Conflict Model of the Relationship 
The conflict model of the relationship between privacy and medical research values 
is characterised by the idea that privacy conflicts with medical research and does not 
in any way support it. However, this idea can lead to two opposed views because 
neither the relative value to be attached to medical research values and privacy, nor a 
specific view of what values medical research seeks to protect, are part of the conflict 
model per se. However, those medical researchers who see privacy as essentially a 
hindrance to medical research to be removed are apt to claim (or at least strongly 
imply) that the values that medical research seeks to promote are exclusively values 
like human health and human life. If so, it is reasonably inferred that the values that 
medical research seeks to promote are always more important than privacy. Ergo. if 
there is any conflict between privacy and medical research, then privacy must give 
way. At the extreme, particularly if the narrow conception of privacy is coupled with 
the conflict model, this can result in the view that patients have a duty to engage in 
medical research to the extent that their consent is not required unless the research 
itself is life threatening or involves serious risk of physical harm. On the other hand. 
17 `Personality and Privacy Under the European Convention on Human Rights', British 
Yearbook of International Law. LX1,1990.175-197. at p. 196. 
18 Application No. 6825.74 DR5.87. 
19 See, e. g., the European Court of Human Rights in, e. g., Z. v Finland [ 1997] ECHR 10 
(25 February 1997), paras 96-97, M . 
S. v Sweden (1997) 28 EHRR 1 ;. para 34 (in relation to 
medical data) and in Peck v the United Kingdom [200)] ECHR 44 (28 January 200 ), paras 
78-80 (in relation to other sensitive personal data). 
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opposed to this, if the conflict model is coupled with the broad conception of privacy 
that sees it as a personality right, it can be held that the right to privacy is, in effect, 
the right to autonomy, even the right to dignity, in which case (because human 
dignity is often thought of as the basis of human rights), " this can yield the view that 
medical research can never be undertaken without consent., ' However, because the 
conflict model is normally associated with the narrow concept of privacy and, as I 
will argue in the next section, there are tensions, even a contradiction between the 
conflict model and any conception of privacy that is at least as broad as that operated 
by the European Court of Human Rights, I will not consider this coupling further. 
When the narrow conception of privacy is coupled with the conflict model, 
there are at least two other variables that are capable of influencing the effect of this 
coupling on the importance to be attached to privacy in any conflict with medical 
research values. The first of these is the view taken of the basis of the values at stake. 
The second, which might not be entirely independent of the first, is the view taken of 
the kind of exercise that must be performed to assess the weight that the conflicting 
values have. In relation to the first of these, those who adopt the narrow conception- 
conflict model coupling frequently (though not necessarily) tend to regard the right 
to privacy as grounded in the value to be given to a person's personal wishes (as 
a personal interest), whereas they tend to see the values of medical research to be 
grounded in the public interest (what is good for people in general). In relation to the 
second of these, they tend to see the balance to be assessed in a utilitarian manner, 
which is to say by the idea that the overarching value to be served is the promotion of 
the wishes/the good of the greatest possible number. This combination inevitably has 
the consequence that restrictions on privacy (serving to promote the general good) 
are to be broadly defined, whereas privacy restrictions on medical research (serving 
only individual interests) are to be narrowly defined. This has the further effect that 
the onus is on those whose privacy is threatened by medical research to establish 
their case, should the possibility that they might have a case be recognised at all. 
The Broad Conception and the Co-operative Model of the Relationship 
The central idea that guides a co-operative model of the relationship between privacy 
and medical research interests is that while the two sets of values are capable of 
coming into conflict. they are also capable of supporting each other. Essentially. 
the idea is that protecting privacy can facilitate medical research interests and, 
conversely, medical research can enhance privacy interests. 
20 See the opening of the Preamble to the t. 'niversal Declaration of Human Rights 
proclaimed by the General Assembly of the [nited Nations on 10 December 1948, which 
Declaration the European C'on\ention on Human Rights aims to give partial effect to. 
21 Such a broad view ofthe right to privacy must not be confused with the broad conception 
operated bý the European Court of Human Rights. The right to privacy under Article 8 ECHR 
cannot be a right to autonomy as such and certainly not the right to human dignity as the basis 
of human rights. Were this the case, the ECHR could not provide derogations from privacy in 
its Article 8.2. which it does. 
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The idea that protecting privacy can support medical research is not novel. For 
example, it has long been recognised that one of the reasons for the law to protect 
privacy= and confidential ity23 is that it is in the public interest to do so. That those 
who become ill seek proper medical treatment is in the public interest, because for 
them not to do so means that the risk that they might pass diseases on to others 
is increased, and they are more likely to be absent from work, both of which are 
contrary to the public interest. It is also in the public interest that patients are candid 
with the information they provide to those who are to treat them. Inadequate or false 
information will, at the very least, not facilitate adequate treatment. However, if they 
are to seek treatment and be candid with their doctors, patients must trust them to 
respect their privacy and confidences (to the extent of not making any unconsented 
use of the information that the patients would find objectionable, as well as not 
disclosing information in a way that might embarrass or harm them). 
While this thinking is most familiar in the context of medical treatment, it may. 
however, also be applied to medical research. This is for at least two reasons. First, 
medical researchers are very often clinicians, so to facilitate trust in clinicians is to 
facilitate trust in medical researchers (and conversely, to damage trust in clinicians is 
to damage trust in medical researchers and vice versa). Secondly, even when medical 
researchers are not clinicians, the information they disclose in medical research is 
equally sensitive and, by the same reasoning applicable to information disclosed for 
medical treatment, must be handled with respect for privacy and confidentiality. 
In relation to this, it should be noted that supporting privacy in medical research 
does not merely make it more likely that persons will agree to be subjects in medical 
research. Trust in medical researchers makes it very much more likely that the 
information gained will he accurate and reliable, which is essential for research to 
meets its objectives. 
Another way in which protecting privacy might support medical research 
is suggested by the thinking behind the EC Data Protection Directive. As I have 
already mentioned, the aim of Directive 95/46/EC is to protect fundamental rights 
and freedoms, in particular privacy in the processing of personal data. However, 
as Recitals 7 and 8 of the Directive make clear, at least part of the thinking behind 
this is that such protection is necessary for it to be possible for there to be transfer 
of data across the European Union. This is because Member States, being party to 
the European Convention on Human Rights and other international human rights 
instruments, are committed to protection of fundamental rights and freedoms, and 
many of them have this protection enshrined in their constitutions. Thus, if personal 
data does not receive the necessary rights protection, Member States will not 
permit personal data to be transferred to countries that do not provide the necessary 
protection needed for the internal market in personal data to be possible. However. 
given such a context and given the need for multi-national medical trials if such 
?? See, e. g.. the European Court of Human Rights in I v. Finland (22009! 93) [1997] 
ECHR 10 (25 February 1997), Para 85. 
23 See, e. g., II' v Egdell [ 1990] Ch 359. at p. 419 and p. 422. 
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research is to be most effective, protection of privacy, etc., is necessary for such 
medical research. 
The idea that medical research can support privacy is, perhaps, less obvious. 
However, this idea is inherently plausible under the broad conception of privacy. 
Under this conception, the values that privacy protects include rights to bodily 
integrity and rights to control over persons' personal lives. Medical research, by, at 
least in principle, facilitating alternative and better treatments and a better quality 
of life for those who become ill or simply age, has the potential to give people more 
control over their lives by providing them with more and better therapeutic options. 
One of the consequences of a broad conception of privacy is that privacy does not 
merely protect one value, but several. So, not only is privacy capable of conflicting 
with other non-privacy interests, but some privacy interests are capable of conflicting 
with each other. Furthermore, such a conflict need not be interpersonal, it can also 
be intrapersonal. Bearing in mind that medical researchers, patients and research 
subjects are not inherently different populations, all have interests in medical research 
and privacy. Consequently, the complex interactions that exist between privacy and 
medical research mean that conflicts between privacy and medical research values 
may often be best described as conflicts between difference privacy values or as 
between different medical research values. 
Justifying the Co-operative Model 
If the broad conception of privacy outlined implies a co-operative model, then 
justifying this conception will justify this co-operative model. Since this conception 
is that of the European Court of Human Rights, this can be done by justifying 
following this Court's jurisprudence. In the UK, at least, a strong case can be made 
for this from a legal point of view. 
First, Section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998 requires all legislation and indeed, 
all common laxN (see s 6) to he interpreted so as to be consistent with the rights 
granted by, inter aliu, Articles 2-12 and 14 of the ECHR, unless prevented from 
doing so by primary legislation, if it is at all possible to do so. Regarding this latter 
proviso, the UK Courts have been prepared to strain interpretative licence to the 
limit to avoid declarations of incompatibility with the ECHR. '4 Furthermore, s 
2.1(a) of the Act requires the UK courts to take favourable account of the views of 
the European Court of Human Rights., -` While this is weaker than a requirement to 
comply with the views of the Strasbourg Court, not to do so is an open invitation for 
litigation at the Court. with the almost inevitable result that judgment will be against 
the UK. While the UK Government has recently made noises about ignoring such 
judgments. such action has not yet been taken. 
24 See. e. g., RvA [2001 ]3 WLR 1546 and Rv Lambert [2001 ]3 WLR 206. 
25 The Source Innformatics judgment was delivered shortly before the Human Rights Act 
1998 came into force. 
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Secondly, the use of personal health data in all research falls within the scope 
of Directive 95/46/EC on data protection, and clinical trials on medicinal products 
for human use fall within the scope of Directives 2001/20/EC ('Clinical Trials 
Directive') and Directive 2005/28/EC ('Good Clinical Practice Directive') (both of 
which require Directive 95/46/EC to be observed). Article 6(2)EU requires the EU 
to respect the rights guaranteed by the ECHR as general principles of EC law (and 
Article 288 of the EC Treaty requires the European Court of Justice (ECJ) to apply 
general principles common to the Member States, which has led the ECJ to go so 
far as to declare that any EC legislation that does not comply with such principles 
is null and void). 26 Of course, the EU is not as such party to the ECHR and the 
European Court of Human Rights is not a court of the EU, so its judgments can only 
have persuasive, not legally binding, effect. However, for the ECJ to rule contrary to 
such judgments is to invite constitutional crisis in the Member States because of the 
doctrine of supremacy of EC law and the fact that many Member States are bound by 
their constitutions to respect the views of the European Court of Human Rights. 
Apart from strictly legal reasons to adopt the broad conception/the co-operative 
model, there are also ethical reasons. The co-operative model of the relationship 
between privacy and medical research values sits naturally with a co-operative 
model of the relationship between medical researchers and medical subjects. In 
this latter model, research subjects must be viewed as partners in a communal 
enterprise in which there is mutual (and not merely reciprocal) respect for the rights 
and fundamental interests of all parties. In effect, researchers must view research 
subjects not as information crops to be harvested for the common good or their 
own purposes, but as partners whose purposes are to be respected as though they 
were the researcher's own. In Kantian terms, research subjects are to be treated as 
ends in themselves, with their consent a/wars being required for invasions of their 
rights unless it is necessary to override this for the more important rights of others. 
But, crucially, researchers must not merely not interfere with the rights of research 
subjects. but must positively assist them to enjoy these rights. This is especially 
important where research subjects are concerned, and even more so when they 
are patients. This is because patients and research participants are in a vulnerable 
position in relation to unconsented use of their personal data - for example, they 
might not know of various uses at all, even when they do. the damage might already 
have been done; and, in such cases, their opportunities for redress will be slim 
(they are not usually in a good position. due to lack of resources or knowledge, to 
complain. let alone take legal action, and must further risk conflict with those upon 
whom they rely for their treatment when they are ill or weak). Consequently, unless 
the research culture is regulated (and better still guided) by the goal of respecting 
research subjects as ends in themselves. the rights and interests of research subjects 
will he endemically threatened by medical research. 
Finally, there are pragmatic reasons for adopting the broad conception, /co-operative 
model. A research culture that is based first and foremost on consent encourages trust 
26 See. e. g., The Second: Vuld Case tC'use-, t -3i [1974] E. C. R. 507. 
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and enables data to be kept in a form that is of most use for research, as it can be 
richer, is more likely to be accurate and can be corrected. It also, generally, carries 
the fewest legal risks and is likely to be associated with the best clinical outcomes. 21 
Such reasons, of course, are those that lie behind the idea that protection of privacy 
is in the public interest28 and, indeed, in the public interest in medical research. 
The Co-operative Model and Assessing Conflicts of Interest 
Even within the co-operative model conflicts of interest are possible. The right to 
privacy is not absolute, and can be overridden by other values. This is expressly 
recognised by Article 8.2 of the ECHR. according to which no public authority'" 
may interfere with the right granted by Article 8. l: 
except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in 
the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, 
for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
This provides the general framework for considering conflicts between privacy and 
research values. As Article 8.2 has consistently been applied, research values can 
only he permitted (by public authorities, including, most particularly, the State) 
to override the right to privacy if to do so is necessary for the protection of one 
of the values expressly stated in Article 8.2, the derogation is proportionate (i. e., 
no greater than necessary), and the derogation is provided for by law. In principle, 
subject to these conditions, to the extent that medical research can be held to be for 
the protection of the rights and freedoms of others/be for the protection of health, 
derogation is available for this purpose. However, it should not be thought that this 
27 See Beyleveld, D. and Brownsword, R., 'Ethics Committees: Public Interest, Private 
Interest, and the Ethics of Partnership'. in Lebeer, G. (ed ), Ethical Function in Hospital Ethics 
Committees, Amsterdam, IOS Press, 2002,135-149. 
28 It is worth noting that the Court of Appeal. unlike the High Court. in Source Informatics, 
ignored this consideration altogether. 
29 While the ECHR is directly enforceable only against public authorities at the 
European Court of Human Rights (i. e., is only vertically effective), it does not follow 
that the rights granted bý the ECHR are not rights held against individuals (i. e., not 
horizontally applicable). The idea that the right ofArticle 8.1 may be derogated from for the rights 
of others implies that the rights of the ECHR are held against individuals (i. e., that they 
are horizontally applicable). So, it is arguable that effect can only be given to them 
domesticall\ if the\ are horizontall\ effective in domestic law (see, further, Bevleveld, D. and 
Pattinson, S., 'Horizontal Applicability and Horizontal Effect', October (200? ) Law Quarterly 
Review, 623-644. However, even if this is controversial, the ECHR will, in any event, be 
horizontall\ effective in domestic law when used to interpret domestic law that provides 
actions against individuals. 
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provides the opening for a carte blanche exemption for research from the need to 
protect privacy. 
In the first case, this is because it is questionable to what extent medical research 
may be said to be for the protection of health or represent a right or fundamental 
freedom of others. The basic reason for this is that privacy (like all the human 
rights and freedoms of the ECHR) is a fundamental value, and it is in the nature 
of fundamental values that they can only be set aside to protect other (indeed, 
more important) fundamental values. It might be objected to this that, in that case, 
reference to anything other than the rights and freedoms of others is the only purpose 
necessary. However, this does not actually follow. It is surely the case that the other 
purposes mentioned are all things that are necessary to protect very important rights 
and freedoms of others: breakdowns in public safety, health, national security, etc. can 
(indeed, often do) all threaten life and the necessary means to these (such as adequate 
food, clothing, shelter, etc. ). With this in mind, I suggest that specific reference to the 
rights and freedoms of others is reference to case specific conflicts between rights, 
whereas the other derogatory purposes are purposes that, in a standing way, are 
rights threatening. Thus, the first problem for a carte blanche exemption for medical 
research is that its purposes might not be purposes that constitute the protection of a 
human right or that are expressions of a fundamental freedom. 
But there is also another problem. This is that the condition of proportionality 
is not merely applicable to the degree of rights violation. It also involves the idea 
that the overriding purpose must be more important than the value to be overridden 
in case of conflict. This raises the question of how to assess the relative value of 
different rights and fundamental freedoms in the ECHR. While it is arguable that 
the rights protected by those Articles of the ECHR that are subject to very restricted 
derogation outweigh those (mainly Articles 8,9,10.11 and 12) that are subject to 
wide derogatory provision, this does not help with conflicts between the right of an 
individual of Article 8 and the rights of others of Articles 8,9,10,11 and 12), and it 
still leaves the rights that are more important without a clear rationale for ordering. 
However, it is surely irrational to grant a right to something yet not to grant a 
right to the necessary means to enjoy this right. So, if there are conditions that are 
necessary for the exercise or having of all rights, then a right must be granted to 
these no matter what rights are granted. Since, in principle, rights could be granted 
to any actions, such conditions must be necessary for all actions. I suggest, therefore, 
that the difference between a fundamental right and freedom and other rights and 
freedoms is that the latter are things the absence of which is detrimental to the having 
of any rights or their exercise (and, hence, detrimental to any actions). 
Alan GevOrth calls such conditions 'generic features of action'. '" These are 
ordered in two ways. First, things that are needful to even attempt to act (interference 
hinders an ability to act at all) (`basic needs': such as life, mental equilibrium, the 
general ability to exercise choices, and the necessary means to these, such as food, 
,0 Gewirth, A., Reason and aloralal, Chicago. Univers% of Chicago Press, 1978, pp. 
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clothing and shelter) are distinguished from things needful for general chances of 
success in achieving purposes through one's actions (subdivided into things needful 
to maintain abilities to act - `non-subtractive needs', such as accurate information; 
and things that generically enhance one's abilities to act - `additive needs', such 
as further education). Second, within and between these categories, importance is 
to be assessed by the degree to which the generic features are needful for action 
and successful action (in relation to which Gewirth suggests that the psychological 
theory of Maslow'' might be helpful). 
Gewirth makes much larger claims for this scheme of rights: viz., that agents 
deny that they are agents if they fail to recognise and act according to it. However, 
while I believe that Gewirth is right about this, 32 it is not necessary to accept this to 
see the use (even the necessity) of deploying such a scheme given a recognition of 
human rights). " 
From this perspective, the Peto campaign34 is based on mistaken or misguided 
thinking on a number of counts. First, the campaign seeks a carte blanche exemption 
for medical research. This ignores the fact that privacy is a human right and that not 
all medical research purposes engage human rights and fundamental freedoms: it 
is too broad a church for that. Since this is so, there can be no avoiding the need to 
make purpose by purpose assessments of the possibility of an exemption. 
Second, even if a fundamental value is engaged by the research, it must be 
necessary to override privacy. In other words, the research goals must require privacy 
to be overridden. However, provided that consent is obtained, there is no conflict; the 
research may be carried out without interference with the right to privacy. On this 
front, the Peto campaign claimed that consent was impracticable. However, while 
this might be the case where data has been collected in the past without consent, it is 
difficult to see how this can be the case when data is being collected prospectively. 
It is often said that more harm is caused by putting clinicians to the inconvenience 
of getting consent than by not obtaining consent. However, this judgment is usually 
made from the perspective of ignoring the public interest reasons for protecting 
privacy and is not often accompanied by any consideration of how consent might 
be obtained without placing too great a burden on clinicians. Additionally, the 
Peto campaign claimed that it is necessary to obtain data from 100 per cent of the 
population for epidemiological studies on cancer, so the fact that some patients or 
research subjects might refuse consent damages the research irremediably. This is, 
however, extremely dubious if generalised to all medical research. Indeed, if the 
claim is sound it would argue for all medical research to be carried out without 
3I Maslow, A. F., Motivation and Personality, New York. Harper and Brothers. 1954, pp. 
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33 For further elaboration, see Bevleveld, D. and Brownsword, R., Human Dignity in 
Bioethics and Biolax, Oxford, Oxford University Press 2001, pp. 79-86. 
34 See note 1. sunra. 
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consent. It is also very dubious in relation to cancer epidemiology since the idea of 
a 100 per cent sample can only really mean 100 per cent of the human race. The fact 
of the matter is that research results can be of varying degrees of value: they are not 
either perfect or of no value at all, and degrees of compromise are necessary and 
possible to get the optimal balance of protection. Any other way of thinking ignores 
that breaches of privacy must be proportionate. 
Of course, the Peto campaign will have been bolstered by the decision of the 
Court of Appeal of England and Wales in Source Informatics. However, the Court's 
idea that privacy is not engaged unless breach of privacy would cause specific 
extrinsic harms (which would render processing of the information unfair) simply 
does not accord with the view of the European Court of Human Rights that the right 
to privacy is always engaged by the use of health data without explicit consent. It is 
clear that one of the motivations behind the Court's judgment was to do away with 
case by case judgments of whether or not confidentiality (and by the same token. 
privacy) may be overridden in the public interest (or by countervailing values).. " 
However, the Court seemed to be oblivious of the fact that it was merely replacing 
the need for case by case assessment of this by case by case assessments of fairness. 
But, most seriously. the C'ourt's thinking simply does not conform with the thinking 
required by recognition of the fact that privacy is a human right and the jurisprudence 
of the European Court of Human Rights on this matter. 
Conclusion 
Prima 
. 
facie, the idea that privacy in medical research protects merely against 
disclosure of sensitive or confidential personal information and the extrinsic harms 
that this can cause is attractive to medical researchers, because it suggests that 
protecting against such disclosures is all that is necessary for such information 
to be used in research. However, I have argued that such a position is not legally 
tenable, because the interfaces between UK domestic law, EC law and the European 
Convention on Human Rights, require a broad concept of privacy to be deployed. 
While this is likely to prompt many researchers to call for the law to be changed, it 
should now he clear that this is short-sighted. There are both ethical and pragmatic 
reasons for adopting a broad conception of privacy. These are not merely negative 
(e. g, appreciation that consent fosters an atmosphere of trust which is necessary for 
medical research to flourish). they are also positive (e. g., a consent culture actively 
encourages a willingness for people to engage in medical research and improves 
the quality of results). Wholehearted adoption of the broad conception. however. 
requires the deployment of a co-operative model rather than a conflict model of the 
relationship between privacy values and medical research values. 
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